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THE DECLINE OF JURISDICTION
BY CONSENT*
DAN B. DOBBSt
The parties cannot give a court jurisdiction of the subject
matter' by their consent or acquiescence.2 So sanctified is this
formula that a halo of donstitutionality surrounds it.3 In the name
of this saintly precept a plaintiff may choose his forum, lose his
suit and try again in another forum on the ground that the first
court had no jurisdiction.4
Two broad qualifications to this rule (hereafter called the no
consent rule) must be stated. - The first is that the rule is often wider
and more inclusive than it might sound because any number of
procedural requirements may be treated as jurisdictional and non-
* This article is adapted from a thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of
requirements for the Master of Laws degree, University of Illinois. Al-
though acknowledgments are appropriately reserved for more significant
pieces, I should like to express my thanks to Professors Edward Cleary and
Eugene Scoles, both of the College of Law, University of Illinois, for their
helpful criticism. The usual caveat applies: neither is responsible for
blunders or lesser included crimes committed herein.
t Assistant Professor of Law, University of North Carolina.
The term "jurisdiction of the subject matter" is variously used to mean:
(1) jurisdiction of a kind or class of actions, e.g., jurisdiction over actions
based on contract. BROWN, JURISDICTION OF COURTS §3 (2d ed. 1901);
RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 7, comment b (1942); (2) jurisdiction of a
specific res or thing in controversy, tangible or intangible, e.g., jurisdiction
of the marital status of parties. See Harper, The Myth of the Void Divorce,
2 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 335, 336 (1955) ; (3) jurisdiction to act in general
or to furnish a particular remedy, e.g., the power to act where some pro-
cedural requirement has not been met. See Harper, Collateral Attack Upon
Foreign Judgment: The Doctrine of Pemberton v. Hughes, 29 MICH. L.
REv. 661, 672 (1931). In the last situation, courts may characterize a pro-
cedural requirement as involving jurisdiction of the subject matter, or merely
as "jurisdictional," or as a "condition precedent" to jurisdiction of the sub-
ject matter. See Gavit, Jurisdiction of Courts (pts. 1-3), 11 IND. L.J. 324,
439, 524, 529 (1936). It is not clear why some procedural requirements are
"jurisdictional."
2 See generally 1 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS §§ 337-38 (5th ed. 1925);
BROWN, op. cit. supra note 1, at §§ 3, 10.
' See Gavit, Jurisdiction of the Subject Matter and Res Judicata, 80
U. PA. L. REV. 386 (1932); see also The Marshalsea, 10 Co. Rep. 68b, 74a,
77 Eng. Rep. 1027, 1035 (K.B. 1612).
'Mansfield, C. & L. M. Ry. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379 (1884), holding that
a party removing to federal court may object to the removal on jurisdictional
grounds at any time; Briscoe v. Stephens, 2 Bing. 213, 130 Eng. Rep. 288
(K.B. 1824).
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waivable.5 The second is that the rule is often narrower because in
many situations jurisdiction of the subject matter can in fact be
conferred by consent. Not only may jurisdiction be created by res
judicata, as in "bootstrap" cases,' but acts of the parties which fall
short of res judicata may be sufficient to confer jurisdiction.7
Increasing attention is being paid to cases that rest jurisdiction
in effect on estoppel and in so doing effectively confer jurisdiction
by consent or acquiescence of the parties. A fairly typical, though
undistinguished, case of this sort is Unruh v. Industrial Comm'n.'
There, W had obtained a mail order Mexican divorce from her
first husband, H. She then married T. H died in an industrial
accident. W, pursuing the no consent rule and the compensation,
made her claim for the death benefits. She argued that since the
mail order divorce was void, she was still the legal wife of H. If
so, she was entitled to the death benefits. The Mexican court, of
course, lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter. The wife's divorce
was clearly void, and just as clearly orthodoxy compels the con-
clusion that neither her nor H's consent gave the Mexican court
jurisdiction. The Arizona court, hearing the claim for death bene-
fits, agreed that the Mexican divorce was void and held that W
was indeed still the legal wife of H. But, it said, she was barred
from attacking the Mexican decree by something called quasi-
estoppel. The theory seems to be that the original decree is void-
the law clearly says so-but that no one will be permitted to mention
the fact. The result, of course, is that the "void" decree is to all
intents and purposes validated.
All of this raises several inquiries about the traditional no
See, e.g., State v. Hanes, 187 Kan. 382, 357 P.2d 819 (1960), where it
was held that failure to allege service of notice of appeal, even when actually
served, was a jurisdictional defect that may not be waived. Even venue
limitations are sometimes treated as jurisdictional. Ahrens v. Clark, 335
U.S. 188 (1948) (court will raise issue on its own motion). Jurisdictional
amount, see Bent's Ex'r v. Graves, 3 McCord 280 (S.C. 1825), and, apart
from statute, term time are jurisdictional. Gregg v. Cooke, 7 Tenn. 82
(1823).
'See Triennies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66 (1939).
Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371
(1940), discussed in Boskey & Braucher, Jurisdiction and Collateral Attack:
October Term, 1939, 40 COLUm. L. Rxv. 1006 (1940). Coe v. Coe, 334
U.S. 378 (1948); Di Frischia v. New York Central R.R., 279 F.2d 141 (3d
Cir. 1960), noted in 15 U. MIAMI L. REv. 315 (1961).
'81 Ariz. 118, 301 P.2d 1029 (1956). For cases not involving the di-
vorce setting, see Burgess v. Nail, 103 F.2d 37 (10th Cir. 1939) (alterna-




consent rule. Since there are operational exceptions, if not doc-
trinal ones, does the rule express any truth about the law on the
subject? Is it, in other words, a satisfactory guide for prediction?
If not, what guides in policy, history or logic would assist in
formulating a jurisdictional rule that is responsive to the functional
needs of our own judicial system?
At the outset a certain amount of ingrown nonsense should be
excised. We have come to think of the no consent rule as the in-
evitable product of either logic or the rational demands of policy.
It is not. The rule has not always existed, even in England.'
Furthermore, the rule today rests precariously on this logic: (1)
only the law can confer jurisdiction; (2) the parties are not the law;
(3) therefore, the parties cannot confer jurisdiction.' This has
often seemed acceptable partly because it is patly logical and partly
because it evokes images of the parties as vigilantes taking the law
into their own hands.
But this syllogism is a weak cornerstone indeed. First, it does
not account for the appendage "subject matter" to the rule against
consent. The law also confers jurisdiction over the parties and
usually requires that process be served. If the parties cannot con-
'Y.B. Mich. 30-31 Edw. 1, f. 486, 492, pl. 1 (1303): "Within these
twenty years people have been accustomed to take bonds, binding debtors to
submit to the decision of the Holy Church in Mercantile matters, and by
those obligations they used to draw to the Church pleas of debt .. and it
was seen that that was against law.. . ." MAITLAND, A Conveyancer in the
Thirteenth Century, in 2 THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF FREDERIC WILLIAM
MAITLAND (Fisher ed. 1911) (setting forth an obligation to submit to "all"
jurisdiction). Professor Adams cites a case where the parties were allowed
to proceed in court christian when it was shown "that the plaintiff had signed
a previous agreement to submit to the jurisdiction of the bishop." Adams.
The Writ of Prohibition to Court Christian, 20 MINN. L. Rnv. 272 (193,
England tends to be less concerned with jurisdiction than we are though
the English cases are hopelessly in conflict. Generally, compare 9 HALS-
BURY, LAWS OF ENGLAND, Courts §§ 824-25 (3d ed. 1954), with 11 id. at
Crown Proceedings §§ 219-22. See also South Africa: Magistrates' Court
Act, § 45,3 Union Stat. 1013 (So. Afr. 1950); Truck & Car Co. (Pty.) v.
Ewart, [1949] 4 So. Afr. L.R. 295 (jurisdiction by consent permitted as to
subject matter) ; Colson, Jurisdiction by Consent in Magistrates' Court, 2 So.
AFR. L.T. 82 (1933), criticizing an earlier statute; Roman Law, Dutch-Roman
Law: 1 VOET, COMMENTARY ON THE PANDECTS 202, particularly 215, 218
(Gane transl. 1955); cf. Malcomes & Co. v. Allkin & Co., [1914] C.P.D,
519 (So. Afr.), apparently following Dutch-Roman law; Canon Law: see
BURKE, COMPETENCE IN ECCLESIASTICAL TRIBUNALS 4-5, 15-16, 25-28
(1922). See also 1 HISTORICAL LAW TRACTS 313, 369 (Edinburgh, 1758):
parties may not consent to jurisdiction of "time or place," but may consent
to jurisdiction of "subject matter."
1 1 FREEMAN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 674-77. The second premise is
usually unstated.
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sent to jurisdiction of the "subject matter," is there any logical
reason why the rule should not apply to jurisdiction of the person
as well?
Consider, however, the larger implications of this logic. Its
structure and import are virtually identical with and probably stem
from the property notion that one can convey only what he has.
It is not difficult, however, to find policies overriding this persuasive
logic in the property field, so that it is often possible for Possessor
to convey to Innocent the property of Gullible even though Pos-
sessor has no title which he himself can assert.
More important, the logic of the no consent rule does not stand
on its own two feet. An alternative conclusion is logically possible
and it would be wholly consistent with the method and rules of the
common law. We might say, for example, that when the parties
fail to raise a jurisdictional issue in a timely manner, the law confers
jurisdiction, not the parties.1 Such a conclusion is consistent even
with the premises above.
Furthermore, a choice of different premises, 2 a choice that can
conform to common law rules, would force a recognition of juris-
diction by consent. Consider this well accepted idea of contract law
and the results that follow: (1) contracts of the parties, express or
implied, will be enforced by the law (unless such contracts are
against public policy) ; (2) consent to jurisdiction of a court is a
contract, express or implied; (3) therefore, the law will enforce
jurisdiction conferred by consent of the parties (unless this is against
public policy).13
" Acts of parties are often attributed to the "law." Compare, for example,
the effect of a voluntary conveyance and the renunciation of a devise under a
will. The "voluntary conveyance" may be subject to attack as in fraud of
creditors, or the vendor may have a tax liability. But if he merely "re-
nounces" under a will, his act may not be treated as a conveyance for either
purpose. See Bradford v. Calhoun, 120 Tenn. 53, 109 S.W. 502 (1908)
("The renunciation is not a voluntary conveyance. . . ."); People v. Flana-
gan, 331 Ill. 203, 162 N.E. 848 (1928); ATxINSON, WILLS 774-76 (2d ed.
1953). See also Dabin, General Theory of Law, in THE LEGAL PHILoSo-
PHIES OF LASK, REDBRUCH, AND DABIN 250 (20th Cent. Leg. Phil. Ser.,
Wilk transl. 1950), discussing the "transformation" of contractual rules
into the "law of the state."
' Oliphant & Hewitt, Introduction to RUEFF, FROM THE PHYSICAL TO
THE SOCIAL SCIENCES at ix-xxxii (1929), discussing the significance of
the choice of premises.
" Interestingly enough one theory of contracts turns the proposition
around by arguing that a contract confers sovereignty on the parties, i.e.,
the legal ability to use the state's power to enforce a contract. See Cohen,
The Basis of Contract, 46 HARv. L. REv. 553, 585 (1933).
[Vol. 40
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Such a choice of premises would.put the emphasis where it be-
longs and would force us to ask the right question-what are the
public policies, if any, against consent to jurisdiction, and how do
they balance against the need to end litigation? The search for
these policies seems particularly appropriate in this area because the
cases permitting jurisdiction by estoppel are not in accord as to when
that "estoppel" occurs or as to its ultimate effect.' 4 It is also im-
portant because it has been implied on the one hand that we should
"validate" all void judgments 5 and on the other that we should
"validate" only those decrees that terminate a marriage. 16 A
rational determination of these disputed issues demands more than
the arbitrary choice of a logical premise.
As a first step in the search for policies supporting the no
consent rule a general outline of the rule's development is pertinent.
The purpose here is to sketch such an outline.
In looking at this kind of material it is necessary to make two
things clear. First, consent is functionally equivalent to estoppel or
acquiescence; that is, estoppel and acquiescence are different from
explicit consent only in degree and only in that they imply no col-
lusion. Thus the term "consent," as used here, is treated as
synonymous with estoppel and its variants. Second, consent to
jurisdiction does not mean that the parties can force a court to
accept a case not within its jurisdiction. The frame of reference
' Cases sometimes speak of estoppel because of "acquiescence." Hafey
v. Hafey, 57 N.D. 381, 222 N.W. 256 (1928); sometimes because of "ac-
ceptance of benefits." See American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Taussig,
255 F.2d 765 (7th Cir. 1958); Allendorf v. Daily, 6 Ill. 2d 577, 129 N.E.2d
673 (1955); and sometimes for an assortment of reasons, including the
court's resentment. Bledsoe v. Seaman, 77 Kan. 679, 95 Pac. 576 (1908).
The effect of the "estoppel" on third parties is not always clear. See
Krause v. Krause, 282 N.Y. 355, 26 N.E.2d 290 (1940), intimating that
jurisdiction by estoppel may bind some, but not all. Because of this kind of
confusion, the use of estoppel theories may diminish in favor of res judicata
theories to accomplish similar results. Cf. Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S.
581 (1951).
t See GAVIT, supra note 1, at 386, suggesting that "void" judgments
be treated as arbitration awards, since the parties intended a "submission."
For a criticism, see Comment, The Effect of Extra-Jurisdictional Decisions,
34 ILL. L. REv. 567 (1940).
" Clark, Estoppel Against Jurisdictional Attack on Decrees of Divorce,
70 YALE L.J. 45, 68 (1960): estoppel jurisdiction "rests . . . upon the
contemporary view that when a marriage has ended . . . little is to be
gained by treating it as if it were still in force."
' Thus jurisdiction by consent seldom has reference to appellate juris-
diction as distinguished from appellate review of trial court jurisdiction.
Defects in appellate jurisdiction are usually attacked in timely manner -or
are forgotten. For this reason and because of policies favoring appellate
19611
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
here is the kind of case in which the court and the parties fail to
observe a jurisdictional defect and which proceeds to a full adjudica-
tion on the merits without objection.
POLITICAL AND CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND OF THE RULE
The spirit of the rule against consent to jurisdiction can perhaps
be seen in Bracton's assertion"s that the king is the fountain of
justice and that all jurisdiction derives from him. Yet in the
thirteenth century and for a long time afterward there was nothing
inevitable about the rule. If the spirit was there, it was by no
means certain that the spirit would be made flesh.
If we put aside the Roman law maxims that embody the rule19
and look for policies that support or condition it, two or three points
stand out almost from the beginning of our law. The first is that
the English courts were not, with certain exceptions, created. They
did not proceed from a written constitution. They merely grew like
Topsy. The result was that the boundaries of their jurisdiction were
indistinct and could only be developed in one way: by assertion-
successful assertion-of jurisdiction, case by case." The boundaries
of their jurisdiction could be limited only by the obverse, that is,
by the unsuccessful assertion of jurisdiction. In short, the juris-
dictional concept was a fundamental constitutional tool for allocating
power.2' It did not merely push the pegs into pre-cut holes; it built
the very framework of the judicial system.
control of the docket, the policy of dealing only with cases and controversies,
and similar policies, jurisdiction by consent as used here does not refer to
appellate jurisdiction as such. For similar reasons, "subject matter" is
not a workable test of appellate jurisdiction. See M'Call v. Peachy, 5 Va.
(1 Call.) 55 (1798).
i" See 1 HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 87 (7th ed. 1956)
[hereinafter cited as HOLDSWORTH]; Maitland, Select Pleas of the Crown
in, MATERIALS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 42-44
(Goebel ed. 1931); 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW 528-29 (2d ed. 1898).
"' DIGEST 2.14.38: The law of the state cannot be varied by agreement
of private persons. Similar maxims were used by Coke in the seventeenth
century, but in a different context. Beaumont's Case, 9 Co. Rep. 138b, 141b,
77 Eng. Rep. 928, 934 (C.W. 1612): "[P]acta privata juri publico derogare
non possunt"; Butt's Case, 7 Co. Rep. 23a, 23b, 77 Eng. Rep. 445, 446 (C.P.
1600).
" Cf. MAITLAND, ROMAN CANON LAW IN THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND
120-21 (1898) : in the medieval church, questions of constitutional law could
be settled only by "persistent and relentless usurpation. Claims to jurisdic-
tional superiority were being urged which had behind them no principle ex-
cept that which recognizes the accomplished fact...."
,1 See Goebel, Constitutional History and Constitutional Law, 38 COLUM.
[Vol. 40
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The second salient fact of life here was that medieval England
was pock-marked with a multitude of courts serving a multitude of
purposes, and that they were usually in the process of some muddled
metamorphosis.
22
Finally, there was a striking absence of conflict of laws rules for
dealing with this kind of common law federalism. And since each
kind of court might administer different rules of law or even wholly
different systems of law, the choice of jurisdiction was often a choice
of a legal system or a legal rule.24  Thus it was crucial to the
survival of a given system of law that the court which enshrined
it be preserved from "encroachment" by other courts and other
systems.
25
This is the formula for conflict and competition. And the di-
versity of national, feudal, local and clerical interests gives body and
substance to it. At its broadest and highest level, the conflict be-
tween the inferior courts and the king's courts can be seen in terms
of the need for a "common" law and national policy.2" Certainly
national courts did serve national policy; certainly they did in fact
make a law common for the nation. But few kings were state
planners. They were, in medieval England, concerned more deeply
with the realities of power-particularly the power of the church.
L. Ray. 555, 564 especially n.26 (1938). Compare MAITLAND, ROMAN CANON
LAW IN THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND (1898).
"See generally 1 HoLDswoRTH 680-84 passim, listing over 400 different
courts.
" Sack, Conflicts of Laws in the History of the English Law, in LAw-A
CENTURY OF PROGRESS 1835-1935, at 342 (1937).
"4 See generally id. at 356-57, and especially 420 n.154. Thus Coke says
that when "one rule of law" is not sufficient, a new court is created, not
merely a new law. 4 COxE, INsTITUTEs 63 (1817) [hereinafter cited as
COKE].
"5This, of course, was particularly important as new systems of law
were gaining in power, popularity and usefulness. England came dangerous-
ly close to a "reception" of civil law. MAITLAND, English Law and the
Renaissance (Rede Lecture, Cambridge, 1901), in MAITLAND READER 221
(Delany ed. 1957), and SELECTED HISTORICAL ESSAYS OF F. W. MAITLAND
135 (Cambridge ed. 1957); Cf. MAITLAND, Outlines of English Legal His-
tory, 1560-1600, in 2 THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF FREDERIC WILLIAM MArT-
LAND 417, 442 (Fisher ed. 1911). The growth of admirality and the libera-
tion of the ecclesiastical courts which put them on the same plane as common
law courts, see Caudry's Case, 5 Cro. Rep. la, 77 Eng. Rep. 1 (K.B. 1591),
made the common lawyers particularly aware of the dangers of "encroach-
ment" on the common law by these alien systems.
" See 10 HOLDSWoRTH 343 (6th ed. 1938). Common law decisions were
important as an arm of the state because they were not merely deciding
private disputes but were in fact creating, in large measure, the constitution.
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As Maitland puts it succinctly, the church was a state." It was
operating courts, taxing the realm2 8 and asserting power to affect
English land titles.29 Through the pope it issued royal decrees and
decided international disputes."0 It claimed to be the supreme
secular as well as the supreme spiritual authority."' It was a
genuine threat to national sovereignty.
Jealousy of the church courts as well as of the church itself
is therefore to be expected. A Parliament whose function was not
yet fixed could not do everything, and medieval kings could not
always cow its Lords Spiritual in any event. The courts, which had
the advantage of regular meetings, assumed the job of eroding as
much competition as they could in private litigation.
Secular courts were also a problem to national "policy makers."
They tended to crop up without authority, and though attempts
were made to put down such courts, 2 kings continued to issue
charters creating more." And aside from charter, some courts
could grow up by prescription, assuming jurisdiction simply be-
cause they had exercised it from "time out of mind. '3 4 Local courts
"' MAITLAND, ROMAN CANON LAW IN THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND 100
(1898)." Statute of Carlisle, 1307, 35 Edw. 1 (repealed). See the "tearful com-
plaint" of both the "magnates" and clergy (1247) in 3 WILKINSON, CON-
STITUTIONAL HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 1216-1399, at 253 (1958).
S*29 This was accomplished through decisions on bastardy. See INRO-
DUCTION TO THE CURIA REGIS ROLLS, 1199-1230, at 104 (62 Seld. Soc.,
Flower ed. 1944), reporting a case where the justices disregarded an appeal
to the Pope because "no appeal of bastardy should be made without the
realm." See also Statutes of Merton, 1235, 20 Hen. 3, c. 9 (repealed).
" See Goebel, Introduction--Matrix of Empire to SMITH, APPEALS TO
THE PRIVY COUNCIL FROM THE AMERICAN PLANTATIONS at xlvii (1950)
(arbitration between kings).
" Pope Boniface VIII, Bull Unam Sanctu (1302), in SELECT HIS-
TORICAL DOCUMENTS 435 (Henderson ed. 1892). In 1299 Boniface "claimed
Scotland as a fief of Rome." 1 WILKINSON, op. cit. supra note 28, at 54,
62.
6. See 1 HOLDSWORTH 88 (quo warranto inquiries of Edward I).
" See WEINBAUM, BRITISH BOROUGH CHARTERS: 1307-1660 (1943).
"Prescriptive jurisdiction might be more desirable as less restrictive than
an outright charter. For example, a piepowder court was properly an ad-
junct to a fair or at least a market. 1 HOLDSWORTH 535-40. But "it is
very clear, and not to be denied, that by prescription a man may well have
and hold a court of pipowders, without a fair or market. . . ." Goodson v.
Duffill, 2 Bulst. 21, 23, 80 Eng. Rep. 926, 928 (K.B. 1612), reported sub
norm Goodson v. Duffield, Cro. Jac. 313, 79 Eng. Rep. 268 (K.B. 1612).
There were, however, limits to what could be claimed by prescription. See
Howel v. Johns, Cro. Eliz. 774, 78 Eng. Rep. 1004 (K.B. 1600). See also
the discussion of local customs affecting jurisdiction in London v. Cox, L.R.
2 H.L. 239 (1867).
[Vol. 40
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were sometimes preferred to the central courts because they were
cheaper and quicker,3 5 and in some cases satisfied a desire for local
government and "community judging."3  Since not only case
decisions but a good deal of administrative work went on in these
courts,3 7 they were a threat to strong central control.
Thus, the local secular courts were, along with the church
courts, objects of sovereign jealousy. They were also objects of
the personal jealousy of the king's judges because medieval courts
were profitable institutions; the king's judges earned their money
less through salaries than through fees. 8  (In early times the king
himself had sat to decide disputes for fees.) 3 9  The profit principle
applied on the local level as well" and many a manor was built with
the profits of the lord's court.
4 1
The importance of this is clear, and it can be left to the ma-
terialists to belabor the obvious. Something more fundamental was
also at work driving the inferior courts into disfavor. Their prac-
" See Adams, supra note 9 (better procedure in ecclesiastical courts);
Anonymous, Winch. 8, 124 Eng. Rep. 7 (C.P. 1620) (Admiralty procedure
permitting joinder of claims) ; as to expense and difficulty of travel to West-
minster, see Statute of Westminster, 1285, 13 Edw. 1, c. 38 (repealed),
reciting the evil that people were called to sit on juries for the purpose of
extorting money from them for letting them go in peace "and the Rich men
abide at home" by these bribes; 1 HOLDSWoRTH 280; MAITLAND, DOMESDAY
BOOK AND BEYOND 102 (1921). Attorneys in the central courts seem to
have added to the expense. See the criticism in Gwinne v. Poole, 2 Lut.
935, 1560, 125 Eng. Rep. 522, 858 (C.P. 1692).
" Goebel, Introduction-Matrix of Empire to SMITH, APPEALS TO THE
PRIVY COUNCIL FROM THE AMERICAN PLANTATIONS at xl (1950).
"'1 HOLDSWORTH 135, 185 (Court Leet as chief instrument for local
government); WEBB, MANOR AND BOROUGH 347, 356 (1924) (Leet); id. at
361 (Manor and Hundred); id. at 388-90 (justice Court).
"Judges in the central courts did receive salaries, but payment was apt
to be irregular and in any event they got a considerable portion of their
income from fees. 1 HOLDSWORTH 252-55. For a candid discussion of
competition on this basis among the central courts, see 1 NORTH, LIVES 203
(1826 ed.), describing how the King's Bench "outwitted the Common Pleas,"
and the Common Pleas' attempt to "exclude" the King's Bench by act of
Parliament: "There the Common Pleas thought they had nicked them."
" See INTRODUCTION TO THE CURIA REGIS ROLLS, 1199-1230, at 1-11,
367-68 (62 Seld. Soc., Flower ed. 1944), where John showed "compassion"
by accepting a case for only 40 shillings.
"0 Private courts were often regarded as property and the owner might
take profits either by leasing it or by allowing others to operate the court
and taking the profit or a part thereof for himself. 1 HOLDSwORTH 6; WEBB,
op. cit. supra note 37, at 344. The attorneys in all courts, of course, had
an interest in increasing jurisdiction and litigation in the courts where
they worked.
"MAITLAND, DOMESDAY BOOK AND BEYOND 169 (1921).
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tices too often did not comport with the medieval idea of justice."
There was the constant problem of pressures, bribery and extortion
by "great men." 43  There was the eternal temptation to nick the
outsider. The latter practice was particularly odious and particu-
larly susceptible of resolution in terms of jurisdiction.
Conceptual development, tradition and practical importance of
personal rights united to force a territorial conception of jurisdic-
tion.44 The inferior courts were limited to actions that arose within
the bailiwick.45 Apart from tradition, the theory of the early jury
system-that the jury must know something of the facts-seemed
to require an insistence on territorial competence.40 Perhaps more
important, the limitation of local courts to actions that arose in their
precincts was some protection to the "outsider" in that it limited
the number of "outside" places where he might be sued. This was
important because the "outsider" was under heavy pressure that
could seriously impair his rights. Not only would local procedure
be different, but the defendant was subject to arrest before the trial
for the purposes of guaranteeing his presence. Since travel was
difficult and communications comparatively nonexistent the traveler
caught Pudding Magna, even on a genuine complaint, and would
have it hard indeed. It did not make matters easier on him that
he was also subject to arrest after judgment went against him.
Thus if a court took jurisdiction of an inappropriate cause,
especially if it arose outside the territorial limits of the court, it was
an abuse of the legal system itself and of valued rights of the de-
fendant. It was not the fact that the court exceeded its jurisdiction
as such that was immediately important; it was the fact that in these
circumstances an excess of jurisdiction was indeed an abuse.
' See SAYLES, THE COURT OF KING'S BENCH (Seld. Soc. Lecture, 1959)
(the idea of justice combined with profit motive).
" See, e.g., Statute of Westminster, 1285, 13 Edw. 1, c. 38 (repealed);
Statute made at Northampton, 1328, 2 Edw. 3, c. 2 (repealed); cf. 4 Coxn
63 (need for Star Chamber). Perhaps someone should devote a book to the
law of the "hautes homes." See N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1961, § 1, p. 1, col. 4.
" Conceptually, territorial limitations fit early feudal or semifeudal
organization, and the jurisdiction of the lord's court would naturally be
considered in territorial terms over a given tract or a specificed group of
persons related to a given tract. See MAITLAND, DOMESDAY BOOK AND
BEYOND (1921). Probably much older, possibly Saxon, this conception was
incorporated in a "customal" at least before 1200. See 1 BOROUGH CUSTOMS
127 (18 Seld. Soc., Bateson ed. 1904); 1 HOLDSWORTH 149.
"' By statute in 1275. Statutes made at Marleborough, 1275, 3 Edw. 1,
c. 35 (repealed).
" See Sack, op, cit. supra note 23, at 345.
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Was it not enough then to require the defendant to plead to the
jurisdiction? It was not. First, attorneys in inferior courts, the
king's judges tell us, were sworn to present no pleas to the juris-
diction.47 Second, if a jurisdictional plea was entered, it could be
ignored and the record falsified to show a plea to the merits.4 s The
assumption in either event was that by pleading to the merits, the
defendant admitted the jurisdiction of the court. Such an assump-
tion-apparently still prevalent in 1700 49-- reflects the general
acceptance of jurisdiction by estoppel or consent. Even when
Parliament attempted to limit the acquisition of jurisdiction by
forged records, it did not attempt to foreclose acquisition of juris-
diction by a genuine estoppel as a matter of general law.5" Thus,
the no consent rule was not an immediate result of the known abuses
in inferior courts, but such abuses explain both the central courts'
distrust of inferior tribunals and the importance in England of
adopting the no consent rule.
The king's courts had other reasons for distrusting inferior
courts. They suspected the quality of justice dispensed there quite
apart from intentional abuses. Again they were less concerned
about jurisdiction as such than they were for its practical effects.
The idea that jurisdiction is important in the abstract is a parvenu.
The first and dominant concern was to enforce a just rule of law. A
striking illustration of the fact that the courts were not originally
interested in following merely the logic of some jurisdictional con-
ception is a thirteenth century case in which an objection was made
to an abbot's holding court.5 ' The decision was to allow him juris-
diction "on condition that two knights of the adjacent county of
Essex should be present to see that the knights of the Abbot's court
did right." Such a decision cannot possibly be reconciled with any
theory of jurisdiction we now hold. It is a desire to supervise, to
guarantee justice.
But such a method of supervision could not last. It was too
"See, e.g., Gwinne v. Poole, 2 Lut. 935, 1560, 125 Eng. Rep. 522, 858
(K.B. 1693); The Marshalsea, 10 Co. Rep. 68b, 77 Eng. Rep. 1027 (K.B.
1612).
"' Articuli Super Chartas, 1300, 28 Edw. 1, c. 3 (repealed); Statutes made
at Westminster, 1436, 15 Hen. 6, c. 1 (repealed); The Marshalsea, supra note
47.
,Gwinne v. Poole, 2 Lut. 935, 1560, 125 Eng. Rep. 522, 858 (K.B. 1693).
o See Statutes made at Westminster, 1436, 15 Hen. 6, c. 1 (repealed).
"Described in INTRODUCTION TO THE CURIA REGis ROLLS, 1199-1230, at
97 (62 Seld. Soc., Flower ed. 1944).
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crude. It went out with the idea that one could be criminally
punished for suing in the wrong court." What method then was
available for supervision of inferior courts? Appellate review of
secular court decisions was possible, but not easy;5" and review
probably was not facilitated by the state of legal learning among the
advocates in local courts. Review of ecclesiastical court decisions
was not even possible.
5 4
The extraordinary writs gave expansion to the review of secular
courts and opened the possibility for effective review even of the
ecclesiastical courts. 55 Prohibition, especially, was useful. The writ
of prohibition lay, of course, to prohibit the lower courts from acting
outside their jurisdiction. Consequently, any attempt to supervise
the decision below through this writ had to be made in jurisdictional
terms, that is, by asserting that the lower court was not merely in
error, but lacked jurisdiction. This kind of supervision would be
little supervision indeed unless jurisdiction in some way related to
the merits. But if jurisdiction could in some cases and in some
degree be equated with merits, real supervision would be possible
even though it came in the form of a jurisdictional decision. Either
from insight or muddleheadedness (it is not easy to tell which)
English courts found this possible.
For example, in Harrison v. Burwell, 0 decided in 1670, the
Common Bench obviously wished to avoid a harsh and unreasonable
legal rule of the ecclesiastical courts. The rule in question held that
Harrison's marriage to his great aunt by affinity was void as in-
cestuous. It was obviously preposterous, but the church courts had
jurisdiction of this "subject matter." Harrison sought a prohibition
since no appeal lay to the central courts. The Common Bench was
forced to recognize the church's jurisdiction; but in a long opinion
which examined the merits of the rule, the Levitical basis and the
unnaturalness of incest, the court concluded that the church had no
52 See id. at 105; Adams, supra note 9, at 274-75.
"See 1 HOLDSWoRTH 212-31; PLUCKNErTT, CoNcisE HISTORY OF THE
COMMON LAw 387 (5th ed. 1956). The problem of review is complicated,
especially in early days by lack of written records. Goebel, Introduction-
Matrix of Empire to SMITH, APPEALS TO THE PRIVY COUNCIL FROM THE
AMERICAN PLANTATIONS at xxvii (1950).
"1 HOLDSWORTH 604-05; see POLLOCK & MAITLAND, Op. cit. supra note
18.
"Cf. 1 HOLDSWORTH 228, especially n.10; 2 id. at 396-400, especially 397.
"'2 Ventr. 9, 86 Eng. Rep. 278 (K.B. 1670).
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jurisdiction to judge erroneously.57 The writ of prohibition was
granted, effectively overruling the judgment."8 Similarly, the
action of some administrative bodies was not reviewable in the
central courts. Their errors could only be controlled by collateral
attack; and when appeal was limited, the tendency was to permit
such an attack, treating a mere error in fact-finding as jurisdic-
tional."9 Cases of this sort emphasize the overriding practical im-
portance of the jurisdictional concept in creating a single and
workable judicial system, and emphasize also the reasons for its
use-the abuses and injustices of the non-common law systems.
The central courts at Westminster had, obviously, reason enough
to limit inferior courts in every way they could. Undoubtedly they
would have consistently followed the no consent rule from the
thirteenth century on if they had only conceived it clearly. But they
did not. Too many mental stumbling blocks lay in the path to such
a refined conception-one that violated all the procedural emphasis
on precise and timely pleading.
A part of the conceptual difficulty was that, initially, there was
no recognition of the state as an entity with rights and interests.60
Jurisdiction was not, therefore, thought of as a matter of public law;
there was no such thing. There was the king, but not the crown.
The king's jurisdictional commands were to be respected and a
violation, as when a plaintiff sued in a court with no jurisdiction,
was to be punished.6 Furthermore, up until the seventeenth cen-
tury, courts were developed and their jurisdiction determined by
" The court attempted to justify the action on the basis of a statute, The
Marriage Act, 1540, 32 Hen. 8, c. 38, but the act seems clearly inapplicable.
The preamble reflects a different purpose and it specifically recognizes
the jurisdiction of the church and authorizes dissolution of marriage for
reasons sanctioned by "God's Law."
58 For similar cases, see Shatter v. Friend, 1 Show. 158, 89 Eng. Rep.
510 (K.B. 1691) (Dolbin, J.: "it was an unconscionable and unreasonable
thing to disallow the proof," prohibition granted after judgment), also
reported sub nor Shotter v. Friend, 2 Salk. 547, 91 Eng. Rep. 462 (K.B.
1690); Harris v. Hicks, 2 Salk. 548, 91 Eng. Rep. 463 (K.B. 1694); Gare
v. Gapper, 3 East. 472, 102 Eng. Rep. 678 (K.B. 1803); Gould v. Gapper,
5 East. 345, 102 Eng. Rep. 1102 (K.B. 1804).
50 See Terry v. Huntington, Hardr. 480, 145 Eng. Rep. 577 (Ex. 1668);
Papillon v. Buckner, Hardr. 478, 145 Eng. Rep. 556 (Ex. 1668): the Com-
missioners of Excise taxed certain low wines as "strong waters"; statutes,
12 Car. 2, c. 23, c. 24 (1660) (repealed), and 15 Car. 2, c. 11 (1663) (re-
pealed), allowed only limited appeal. Held: erroneous finding of jurisdic-
tional fact subject to attack collaterally.
60 See 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, op. cit. supra note 18, at 511.
*' See note 52 supra.
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prescription and fictions as well as by statute and royal charter. 2
A system that sets its jurisdictional limitations by prescription,
which is, after all, only "consent" over a period of time, cannot even
think of a rule against jurisdiction by estoppel. It is perhaps no
coincidence that the no consent rule was developed only after juris-
diction by prescription was invalidated."3 Jurisdiction by fiction,
and blatant fiction 64 at that, was on the same plane.
The other half of the no consent rule, the half that makes "sub-
ject matter" the prime test of judicial competence, was even more
clearly out of the question. The concern of English courts was a
concern to maintain limitations on territorial competence,6 5 and this
was true even through the nineteenth century.66 Thus, in spite of
persuasive reasons for the no consent rule, it did not fit well with
the intellectual history of the English law. At the beginning of the
seventeenth century there was little sign of its development. 7 On
the other hand, the never-stagnant common law had been developing
other ideas too, ideas that demanded the no consent rule, ideas that
the great lawyers of the seventeenth century could absorb without
conscious thought.
It has been suggested that one such idea centered on the original
writ. 8 After all, it did mark the jurisdiction of the court and it
shaped the cause of action 2 so that it made both jurisdiction and
subject matter seem important. Surely it did play some part in
forming ideas about jurisdiction and in emphasizing the importance
of subject matter or "cause" as a significant test of jurisdiction.
But the temptation to ascribe the whole jurisdictional conception to
the original writ should be avoided. In the first place, the writ did
"On prescription, see note 32 supra; on jurisdiction by fiction see
PLUCXNETT, op. cit. supra note 53, at 60 (Quominus), 172 (Bill of Middle-
sex), 644-46 (assumpsit) ; for a fiction that did not succeed, see Sack, supra
note 23, at 346: plaintiffs attempted to extend jurisdiction over actions ac-
cruing outside the territorial limits by alleging a deed made at Harfleur (in
Normandy) was made at Harfluer "in the county of Kent."
"Martin v. Marshal, Hob. 63, 80 Eng. Rep. 211 (K.B. 1615); The
Earl of Derby's Case, 12 Co. Rep. 114, 77 Eng. Rep. 1390 (K.B. 1614).
But cf. 4 Coxi_ 81.
"' See, e.g., the description of the Bill of Middlesex in 1 HOLDSWORTH
219-21. Coke makes it sound somewhat more reasonable. 4 CoKE 71.
See notes 44-46 supra.
"See London v. Cox, L.R. 2 H.L. 264 (1887).
8 See ARTICULATION OF THE No CONSENT RULE, infra." See Gavit, JTurisdiction of Courts (pts. 1-3), 11 IND. L.J. 324, 339,
439, 524 (1936).
" Cf. PLUCKNETT, op. cit. supra note 53, at 408; SUTTON, PERSONAL
ACTIONS AT COmmoN LAW 14-33 (1929).
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not vest jurisdiction in the large sense. For example, it did not
mark the boundaries between the King's Bench and Common
Pleas." It certainly had nothing whatever to do with the jurisdic-
tion of the inferior courts or with the church courts. 1 History and
struggle marked those boundaries. The original writ assumed that
the court involved had jurisdiction in the general sense. It merely
authorized the hearing of a particular case thought to be within that
jurisdiction. 2 It would not give jurisdiction to the common pleas
to hear a felony. And the original writ was not the test of juris-
diction in every case. Courts might proceed without it.74  In the
seventeenth century when the no consent rule developed, the original
writ was clearly of diminishing importance. 5
More to the point in developing the notion that one could not
consent to jurisdiction was the very concept of jurisdiction itself-
the concept of "law-speaking."76  The division, at least in earlier
times, between law-speaking and the mere adjudication of disputes
was demonstrated in Fleta's77 description of common law jurisdic-
tion. The courts had jurisdiction of certain actions, he said, but
unless the original writ was issued, they had no cognizance. He
then referred to jurisdiction and to "coercive power," treating them
'0 Thus Fleta: "The . . . resident justices . . . have jurisdiction over all
pleas and actions, real and personal and mixed, provided they have received
warrant by the king's writ to take cognizance of them. . . ." FLETA, bk. 2,
ch. 34 (72 Seld. Soc. 137, Richardson & Sayles 1955). Clearly, "juris-
diction" does not come from the writ.
' See SAYLES, op. cit. supra note 42, at 14-16.
See HASTINGS, THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 157-68 (1947), and
authorities cited in note 69 supra.
" In Coke's day and earlier, Common Pleas could not hear an appeal of
felony. Bowser v. Collins, Y.B. Mich. 22 Edw. 4, f. 30, pl. 11 (1482); The
Marshalsea, 10 Co. Rep. 68b, 77 Eng. Rep. 1027 (K.B. 1612). This was
true whether or not the writ ran. Earlier the appeal of felony was a com-
mon plea. SAYLEs, op. cit. supra note 42.
"" See The Marshalsea, supra note 73. The writ of prohibition could
be cast in the form of an original writ, but it could operate as a judicial
writ as well. In an action of prohibition an original was not necessary
because "the common law ... is a prohibition of itself [and] stands instead
of an original. . . ." Thus writs of prohibition could be issued by the
courts. 4 COKE 99.
"' "[I]n modern times the original writ was not in fact issued except in
very few cases, though it was always supposed to have been issues."
SuTToN, op. cit. supra note 69, at 14.
" The word jurisdiction itself, of course, refers to the capacity to speak
law. See Gobel, Introduction--Matrix of Empire to SMITH, APPEALS TO
THE PRIVY COUNCIL FROM THE AMERICAN PLANTATIONS at xxxvii-xxxix
(1950). Cf. Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869): "Juris-
diction is power to declare law," i.e., speak law rather than decide disputes.
" FLETA, op. cit. supra note 70.
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as separate conceptions, although in the courts they tended to
merge.
The courts were aware of their law-speaking function and effect,
and this awareness must have increased many fold as previously
decided cases came to have greater authority. This greater orienta-
tion toward precedent, Holdsworth thought, began with the develop-
ment of written pleadings and the concomitant change in law report-
ing, a change that began to work a precedent-pointed approach "in
the latter half of the sixteenth and at the beginning of the seventeenth
centuries .... ",78
While it made very little difference who decided a given dispute
so long as public interests were not clearly affected, it made a good
deal of difference who "spoke law." Thus, arbitration based wholly
on consent jurisdiction was as common as it was ancient."0 Al-
though a contract to arbitrate might not be enforced because it
ousted the courts' jurisdiction,"0 an award would be enforced; and
there was no stigma to arbitration for judges themselves acted as
arbitrators."' All this would be anomolous indeed unless it was
recognized that arbitrators were merely deciding disputes;82 they
were not furnishing precedent; they were not speaking law. Hence
consent to their jurisdiction was an adequate basis for their power.
The consequence of this conception of jurisdiction, as dis-
tinguished from the mere power to hear and determine, was that
a decision made without power to speak law is not law, even as
to the parties. It made some sense to hold a judgment void even
if the parties consented to it. To achieve the no consent rule it was
only necessary that this concept of jurisdiction be clearly conceived.
Holdsworth, Case Law, 50 L.Q. Rav. 180, 182 (1934).
One authority dates arbitration in England to the fourteenth century.
Sayre, Development of Commercial Arbitration Law, 37 YALE L.J. 595,
598 (1928). But it is mentioned at least as early as 1206. INTRODUCTION
TO THE CURIA REGIS ROLLS, 1199-1230, at 461 (62 Seld. Soc., Flower ed.
1944). A delightful'account of a fifteenth century arbitration may be found
in Introduction to YEAR Booxs OF HENRY VI, at xvi-lx (50 Sel. Soc.,
Williams ed. 1933). '
" See Sayre, supra note 79, at 609-10 (1928), and the discussion in
Judge Frank's opinion in Kulkukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading
Corp., 126 F.2d 978 (2d Cir. 1942); cf. Vynior's Case, 8 Co. Rep. 81b, 77
Eng&. Rep. 597 (K.B. 1610).
See More, Utopia in THREE RENAISSANCE CLASSICS 106 (Milligan ed.
1953).
8 Compare Carlston, Theory of the Arbitration Process, 17 LAW &
CONTEMP. PRoB. 631 (1952): "Arbitration is the judicial organ of systems
of law not of universal application .... [T~he proper function of arbitra-
tion is to adjudicate and not to create rights .... "
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Perhaps the growing conceptual refinement as much as anything
else brought the no consent rule to light. As previously noted,
the rule is almost identical with the property rule that one cannot
transfer more than he has. For several reasons it was an easy jump
from property rule to jurisdictional rule. First, courts had their
beginnings as private property. They were owned, they made
profits and they might be appurtenant to other, more tangible
property.s3 As late as 1728 they were leased by their owners to
others.8 4 The leap from a rule about property to a rule about courts
is therefore conceptually easy. 5 Second, private law notions had
always been the source of public law development.80 The common
law courts drew more or less consistently on property ideas." For
example, the body politic was analogized to the common law
corporation. This kind of thinking was infectious."" Finally, in
the seventeenth century, when the development of the no consent
rule really began in earnest, the idea that no one could transfer more
than he had seems to have become an all-purpose axiom easily
applied to any subject."9 Locke used it as a foundation for political
theory to limit legislative jurisdiction. No legislature can exercise
arbitrary power, he said, because power is derived from individuals
in society and "nobody can transfer to another more power than
he has in himself; and nobody has an absolute arbitrary power over
himself ... ""
A premise so pervasive and ubiquitous belongs to the culture.91
"See 1 HOLDSWORTH 6; MAITLAND, DOMESDAY BOOK AND BEYOND 169,
344 (1921); WEBB, op. cit. supra note 37, at 339.
8, WEBB, op. cit. supra note 37, at 344.
80 Thus in a discussion of a court's jurisdiction, we can readily recognize
what counsel means in referring to the court's "seisin" of jurisdiction. See
Parisianne Basket Shoes Pty. Ltd. v. Whyte, 59 Commw. L.R. 369, 371
(Austi. 1938).
"' See Goebel, Constitutional History and Constitutional Law, 38 COLUM.
L. REV. 555, 559 n.11 (1938).
8 Goebel, Introduction-Matrix of Empire to SMITH, APPEALS TO THE
PRIVY COUNCIL FROM THE AMERICAN PLANTATIONS at xlvii (1950).
" Goebel, Constitutional History and Constitutional Law, 38 COLUM.
L. REV. 555, 559 (1938).
8 The rule as applied to property is very old indeed and is covered by a
Roman maxim. See DIGEST 41.1.20, 50.17 54; FLETA, bk. 3, ch. 15, § 8
(Selden ed. 1647). Thus there is no intention of saying that the property
form is new in the seventeenth century.
00 LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE § 135 (Gough ed. 1946).
" The idea of "voidness" is similar. Developed in property and canon
law, it is carried over to jurisdictional rules. In this instance, at least, we
can find cases where the connection is made explicit by judges. See Terry
v. Huntington, Hard. 480, 145 Eng. Rep. 557 (Ex. 1668), based in part on
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Masters of the insouciant transmutation of ideas, like Coke, could use
its implications without conscious thought for the premise itself.
The seventeenth century was ready to develop the no consent rule.
ARTICULATION OF THE No CONSENT RULE
Coke's Contributions
It seems fairly clear that when Edward Coke rose to the bench
in 1606 the no consent rule was not a hardened legal notion. Of
course, there had almost always been court action that would be
disregarded as wholly inappropriate. And in 1482 Judge Piggot
had used those magic words, coram non judice ("not before a
judge"), to describe such a situation.92 But the implications of this
phrase were not always clear in the sixteenth century, and to de-
scribe a judgment as void was not necessarily to say that it was in-
curably void, or void "ab initio," so that consent or estoppel would
not cure it.
In 1600 inferior courts were still at their old stand, still forcing
defendants to admit their jurisdiction, still assuming that admission
would confer jurisdiction.9 4 Recent cases had treated jurisdictional
questions as settled when a final judgment had been entered without
objection by the defendant.95
On the other hand the clergy asserted9 6 in 1605 that the com-
mon law courts were issuing prohibitions to the ecclesiastical courts
even after the defendant "admitted" jurisdiction and judgment was
entered. The issuance of such prohibitions seems to imply at least
a tacit recognition of the no consent rule. The clergy objected
strenuously to prohibitions after judgment. In the years after 1606
the rule that an acceptance of a second benefice made the first absolutely
void. Rex v. George, Cro. Car. 354, 79 Eng. Rep. 910 (K.B. 1628).
9 Bowser v. Collins, Y.B. Mich. 22 Edw. 4, f. 30, pl. 11 (1483) ; GOEBEL
& NAUGHTEN, LAW ENFORCEMENT IN COLONIAL NEW YORK 286 n.3 (1944).
"The word "void" was used, for example, where the jurisdiction had
been timely attacked and the only issue was whether there was or was not
jurisdiction so that "void" added nothing to the description. Smith v.
Chomeley, 2 Dy. 135a, 73 Eng. Rep. 295 (K.B. 1556).
" The Marshalsea, 10 Co. Rep. 68b, 77 Eng. Rep. 1027 (K.B. 1612).
"5 Hollmasts Case, Noy. 70, 74 Eng. Rep. 1037 (K.B. 1596); Susans v.
Turner, Noy. 67, 74 Eng. Rep. 1035 (K.B. 1594). In a rather different situ-
ation, otherwise. Colvil v. Huddleston, 1 Dy. 79a, 79b, 73 Eng. Rep. 169,
170 (K.B. 1552).
'Articidi Cleri 1605, art. 3, in 2 COKE 601, and in part in TANNER,




Coke was required to defend this practice on several occasions,
including one before James L" Yet even in his carefully composed
answers to the clerical charges, Coke never explicitly stated the no
consent rule as a comon law doctrine.
Although the conflict with the clergy produced no definitive state-
ment of the no consent rule it dramatized the idea that courts could
be limited if the common law refused to recognize their judgments.
It did something more, it forced Coke to articulate statements that
could only be justified if there was a no consent rule-for example,
the assertion that writs of prohibition would issue at any time.9"
In 1610 the famous case of The Marshalsea9 a case that was
cited as direct authority for two-hundred years,'0 s provided the
occasion for more explicit discussion. The Marshalsea court, or the
Court of the Steward and Marshall,' had tried a case in assumpsit
and rendered judgment against the defendant in that suit. The de-
fendant's surety, Hall, was, in the absence of the defendant, im-
prisoned by court order until the judgment was paid. Hall brought
suit in the Common Pleas for false imprisonment, arguing that the
original judgment, the basis for his imprisonment, was void. There-
fore, he said, the officers had no authority to hold him. Of course,
the liability of the officer could have been made to turn, not on
actual jurisdiction, but on the officer's good faith.' But Coke
accepted the assumption that actual jurisdiction was determinative.
Coke held simply that the Marshalsea court had the jurisdiction
"only of trespass simpliciter," and not "trespass secundum quid...
upon the case." This failure of jurisdiction made the judgment
absolutely void, he said, because it was jurisdiction of the cause that
was significant. (It may be helpful here to say that "cause" later
developed into "subject matter.") Coke proposed the "cause" test
", Prohibitions Del Roy, 12 Co. Rep. 63, 77 Eng. Rep. 1342 (K.B. 1608);
5 HOLDSwoRTH 430." "Prohibitions by law are to be granted at any time .... And it is folly
of such as will proceed in the ecclesiastical court . . . whereof the kings
temporall courts should have the jurisdiction .... And the kings courts
... may lawfully prohibit the same, as well after judgment and execution,
as before." Articidi Cleri, art. 3; see also id. at art. 10.
" 10 Co. Rep. 68b, 77 Eng. Rep. 1027 (K.B. 1612).... As late as 1814. Grumon v. Raymond, 1 Conn. 39 (1814).
"'For discussion of this court, see 1 HOLDSWoRTH 208.
102 Previous cases had dealt more in terms of good faith than in terms of
jurisdiction. See Windham v. Clere, Cro. Eliz. 130, 78 Eng. Rep. 387 (K.B.
1589); cf. Skewys v. Chamond, 1 Dy. 59b, 73 Eng. Rep. 131 (K.B.
1545).
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of competency, not on the basis of any common law doctrine, but
on the basis of inductive reasoning. He took a series of cases that
had held or indicated that a judgment was "void." In each instance
he thought he was able to discern that there was a defect of juris-
diction relating to cause. He looked, for example, at a case in-
volving an action taken after the end of the term. The proceeding
had been held void. This was so, said Coke, because after the term
there was no jurisdiction of the cause. He then reviewed apparently
contrary authority. In some cases Coke could see that judgments
had been held valid even though jurisdictional defects had clearly
existed. He explained this seeming anomoly by saying that juris-
dictional defects invalidated the judgment only if they deprived the
court of jurisdiction of the cause. If the court had jurisdiction of
the cause, any other jurisdictional defects were treated as mere
error. A similar analysis had been made in a fifteenth century case,
but without the English word "cause" as the basis for distinction.1 °20
It is probably fair to say that Coke's test-"jurisdiction of the
cause"-is the beginning of our use of "subject matter" as the
special test of judicial competence.
As to consent jurisdiction, Coke was not so clear. There are
several dicta in The Marshalsea that imply a limitaion on juris-
diction by estoppel. There was a statute"0 3 involved that expressly
forbade jurisdiction by estoppel as to the surety, so that the surety
would not be bound by the party's failure to object to jurisdiction.
Coke also seems to say that the party himself will not be bound,
but the reason may be that the Marshalsea court had the habit
of falsifying jurisdictional facts. At any rate, Coke does not lay
it down as an unequivocal common law doctrine that the party may
not consent to jurisdiction.
In his lifetime, Coke lectured nearly everyone, including the king,
on jurisdiction, but he never formulated any consistent theory on the
consent problem. 4 In certain local courts, he thought0 5 jurisdiction
was settled if the defendant failed to seek prohibition before a final
judgment was entered although such a defendant had an action in
1... Bowser v. Collins, Y.B. Mich. 22 Edw. 4, f. 30, pl. 11 (1483).
'08 Statutes made at Westminster, 1436, 15 Hen. 6, c. 1 (repealed).
... For example, Coke stated the general rule that "where the court bath
no authority to hold a plea of the cause ... it is corant non judice," and false
testimony is not perjury. 3 COKE 163. Elsewhere, however, Coke thought
"it was justice in the parliament to punish perjury" in a court of requests
"although the court were holden by usurpation...." 4 id. at 98.10;2 id. at 229.
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the nature of a tort action against a plaintiff who had taken him
into a court of no jurisdiction. On the other hand, he asserted0 6
that ecclesiastical courts could be prohibited at any time, even
after the defendant had "admitted" jurisdiction. Still again, he
expressed 1 7 dislike for those who sought prohibitions only after
they saw their case going badly and he threatened to turn a deaf
ear to their jurisdictional pleas. But in the same case, he slipped
in an unsupported dictum that consent would not give jurisdic-
tion. °0 s
Although he could not be consistent, Coke demonstrated force-
fully the practical uses of the jurisdictional concept. He tied it
firmly to the idea of voidness-that is, he specified clearly the effect
of no jurisdiction. And he dramatized the constitutional importance
of jurisdiction in an era that was erupting constitution makers. 09
Jurisdiction by Consent After Coke
For the rest of the century, that is, until about 1700, Coke's
"cause" as a test of competence was either ignored or rejected." 0
The territorial limit on jurisdiction was still more important.
As for the idea of consenting to jurisdiction, the seventeenth
century inherited Coke's confusion on the subject. No integrated
100 See note 98 supra.
1"The Admiralty Case, 12 Co. Rep. 77, 77 Eng. Rep. 1355 (K.B. 1610).
10' "[A]lthough the admittance of the party cannot give a jurisdiction to
the Court where it of right hath none, for that will be an encroachment upon
the common law; yet when the Court shall be advised that is is merely for
vexation, and shall be intended for delay ... unless that he can shew good
matter . . . it shall not be granted." Id. at 78, 77 Eng. Rep. at 1356.
See also WALLACE, THE REPORTERS 167 (1882). This may reflect "addi-
tions" of later years, not what was said or decided. Cf. 5 HOLDSWORTHr 464.
Compare Clark's Case, 5 Co. Rep. 64a, 77 Eng. Rep. 152 (K.B. 1596). P, a
burgess, assented to a town tax; he then failed to pay and was imprisoned;
he sued for false imprisonment. Held: the taxing ordinance was void as
against chapter 29 of the Magna Charta, and the "plaintiff's assent cannot
alter the law in such a case."
10 In The Marshalsea, 10 Co. Rep. 68b, 77 Eng. Rep. 1027 (K.B. 1612),
Coke specifically evoked the Magna Charta on the jurisdictional question.
The famous twenty-ninth chapter, he said, prohibits "every oppression
contra legum terrae.... Then, if any against the law usurp any jurisdiction
[and] by colour of an ursurped authority oppress any man ... he may be
punished by that statute." Id. at 74a, 77 Eng. Rep. at 1035. Compare
Clark's Case, 5 Co. Rep. 64, 77 Eng. Rep. 152 (K.B. 1596) (taxing ordinance
void as against Magna Charta; no consent will validate).
110 Squib v. Holt, 1 Fr. 193, 89 Eng. Rep. 137 (K.B. 1675), reported
sub nor Squib v. Hole, 2 Mod. 29, 86 Eng. Rep. 922 (K.B. 1675): Coun-
sel's argument based on The Marshalsea, supra note 109, was rejected in
favor of emphasis on the territorial limits on jurisdiction.
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concept of jurisdiction and no universally applicable rule against
consent to jurisdiction appeared. The confusion on the subject
can be illustrated by a single line of cases. Coke had asserted both
the power and the duty to issue writs of prohibition even after the
lower court had entered judgment. Suppose, however, that the
courts refused to issue prohibition after a final judgment below, as
they sometimes did."' Should such cases be taken as approving
jurisdiction by estoppel or "admittance?" In refusing a writ of
prohibition in such cases, the courts might be saying: "After judg-
ment, prohibition is not procedurally proper; but you may collaterally
attack the judgment even though writ of prohibition is denied."
Or the courts might be saying: "If you fail to raise the jurisdictional
question until after judgment, the affair of jurisdiction is settled and
the judgment is valid."
Coke, in dicta, had specifically said.. that in certain circum-
stances, the refusal to grant prohibition did not end the jurisdictional
question. Other judges, however, assumed that the defendant had
to raise the jurisdictional issue before judgment was entered against
him and that if he did not do so, he had consented to jurisdiction.
For example, a prohibition after a judgment in Admiralty was re-
fused in 16Z0 on the ground that the "poor marriners" should not
be delayed in their wages and that Admiralty was better equipped
procedurally to hear their claim."' Such a decision clearly did not
contemplate any further litigation on the jurisdictional issue; it
contemplated that the defendant ship-master would pay his "poor
marriners." Thus, jurisdiction was given by consent. This par-
ticular practice apparently became common in spite of a statute that
I" Endike v. Steed, 1 Fr. 294, 89 Eng. Rep. 213, reported sub nom
Mendyke v. Sting, 2 Mod. 271, 86 Eng. Rep. 1067 (K.B. 1677); Smith v.
Poyndreill's Ex'r, Cro. Car. 97, 79 Eng. Rep. 686 (K.B. 1627); Anonymous,
Winch. 8, 124 Eng. Rep. 7 (C.P. 1620); Hollmasts Case, Noy. 70, 74 Eng.
Rep. 1037 (K.B. 1596); Susans v. Turner, Noy. 67, 74 Eng. Rep. 1035
(K.B. 1594); cf. Anonymous, 1 Vern. 301, 23 Eng. Rep. 482 (Ch. 1684):
failure to plead to the jurisdiction is good reason to deny writ of prohibition,
but "I will grant a prohibition for the king in such a case. . ."; Anonymous
(Case 1), Sty. 45, 82 Eng. Rep. 517 (K.B. 1647); Anonymous (Case 2),
Sty. 45, 82 Eng. Rep. 517 (K.B. 1647). See also 7 BACON, ABRIDGEMENT
232, 529 (Phila. ed. 1860).
112 Prohibition, 12 Co. Rep. 76, 77 Eng. Rep. 1354 (H.L. 1610), holding
that after excommunication, no prohibition would lie, but certain forms of
collateral attack might be available. Excommunication was used as a
punishment for ecclesiastical contempt, and after it remained in force forty
days the victim could be imprisoned under a Chancery writ. See 2 PHILLI-
MORE, ECCLESIASTICAL LAW 1089-90 (2d ed. 1895).
"'Anonymous, Winch. 8, 124 Eng. Rep. 7 (C.P. 1620).
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forbade this kind of suit in Admiralty. Chief Justice Holt spoke
of it in 1700,114 saying that it would be permitted in spite of the
statute because "common error makes law" even jurisdictional law.
Similarly, Justice Rolle," 5 in the middle of the seventeenth
century, twice "advised to the next term" without granting writs of
prohibition where the defendant "had admitted the jurisdiction of
the Court by pleading" to the merits. Although in another case" 6
he expressed the no consent rule in a dictum, he thought it was
"mischievous to grant a prohibition in this case, for thereby many
judgments will be stopped."
Only Chief Baron Hale seems to have considered explicitly
whether denial of prohibition because of the party's admission of
jurisdiction was merely denial of a particular remedy or was an
affirmance of jurisdiction by consent. In 1668 he recited'17 the
maxim that the law aids the vigilant, not the sleepy, suggesting that
a party could effectively consent to jurisdiction by failing to raise the
issue in time. "It was a hard case," he said, but at least in the civil
law courts, if prohibition was denied, collateral attack was also fore-
closed. In the same case, however, he allowed a collateral attack
on the decision of an administrative tribunal even though it was too
late for a writ of prohibition."'
Thus, the prevailing assumption, liberally sprinkled with in-
consistency, was that if the defendant failed to raise the jurisdictional
issue, he was estopped to attack the jurisdiction later, either in pro-
hibition or collateral attack. If this is so, then how did the cases
ever develop the no consent rule? Two or three reasons suggest
themselves. One is that the consent of the parties became dis-
guised in a procedural rule: the jurisdictional defect must show
on the face of the record, and if it does not, prohibition will be
1 Clay v. Snelgrave, 1 Ld. Raym. 576, 91 Eng. Rep. 1285 (K.B. 1700),
per Holt, C.J.: "[I]t is an indulgence, that the Courts at Westminster per-
mit mariners to sue for their wages in the Admiralty Court, because they
may all join in suit, and it is grounded upon the principle quod communis
error facit jus ... ." Chief Justice Holt also thought that prohibition was
discretionary. On this point, the ease was overruled in London v. Cox, L.R.
2 H.L. 239 (1867).
"' Anonymous (2 Cases), Sty. 45, 82 Eng. Rep. 517 (K.B. 1647).
... Hill v. Bird, Sty. 102, 82 Eng. Rep. 563 (K.B. 1648), citing an ap-
parently unreported case.
""Terry v. Huntington, Hardr. 480, 145 Eng. Rep. 557 (Ex. 1668);
Papillon v. Buckner, Hardr. 478, 145 Eng. Rep. 556 (Ex. 1668) (com-
panion case).
118 This was probably influenced by the fact that no appeal was allowed
except to the justice courts. See text at note 59 supra.
1961]
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denied even where judicial notice of geographical facts would indi-
cate a failure of jurisdiction.' 9 As this disguise gained acceptance,
it seemed more and more like a rule of procedure having nothing
to do with jurisdiction by consent. The prohibition cases were safely
locked in logic-tight compartments.' 2' And while this process was
going on, another procedural practice developed the no consent rule.
Procedural Development of the No Consent Rule
In 1605 the King's Bench assumed that estoppel would confer
jurisdiction, but held that the plaintiff in the inferior court had to
allege the jurisdictional facts.' 2 ' This was required even though
such facts were put in issue by the defendant and a verdict rendered
for the plaintiff. Now this was not a requirement that the plaintiff
prove his jurisdictional facts ;122 it was a requirement that he allege
... See Tourson v. Tourson, 1 Rolle 80, 81 Eng. Rep. 342 (K.B. 1614)
(per Coke); cf. Gardner v. Booth, 2 Salk. 549, 91 Eng. Rep. 464 (K.B.
1698). This face of the record rule, familiar today as a general rule of
prohibition, originally was used only where the defendant had failed to object
to the jurisdiction-that is, where he had a timely objection, he was not
limited to the face of the record in presenting his case for the writ of pro-
hibition. Cf. Aubin v. Cox, 1 Ventr. 180, 86 Eng. Rep. 122 (K.B. 1677).
A similar line of cases and texts had it that an "imparlance" admitted
the jurisdiction. Imparlance was a procedural stage, roughly analogous to
an appearance or a request for time in which to plead. See STEPHEN,
PLEADING 162 (1894). It was used in inferior as well as the central courts.
See Anonymous, 1 Ventr. 333, 86 Eng. Rep. 216 (K.B. 1679). The general
rule seems to have been that after imparlance, "the jurisdiction would be ad-
mitted." Aubin v. Cox, supra note 119; 7 BACON, op. cit. supra note 111, at
529-30; 1 COMYN, DIGEST 5, 71 (Dublin ed. 1785); GILBERT, HISTORY OF
COMMON PLEAS (3d ed. 1779); VINER, ABRIDGEMENT OF LAW AND EQUITY
338-39 (2d ed. 1793). The cases and texts do not seem to make any dis-
tinction between admission of jurisdiction of the person and any other kind of
jurisdictional admission. The only exception to the theory that imparlance
admitted jurisdiction appears to be that a plea of "ancient demesne" could be
made after imparlance. See 7 BACON, op. cit. supra note 111, at 529-30; cf.
Marshall's Case, Cro. Cas. 9, 79 Eng. Rep. 613 (K.B. 1625), doubting that
imparlance barred a plea of ancient demesne but taking the matter under
advisement. The reasons for the ancient demesne exception are suggested in
Alden's Case, 5 Co. Rep. 105a, 77 Eng. Rep. 217 (K.B. 1600): ancient
demesne based on custom of manor; this is best determined by those who best
know the custom, i.e., the lord's court. Also, the plea may have been
regarded as a plea in bar rather than in abatement. David v. Lyster, Sty.
90, 82 Eng. Rep. 553 (K.B. 1648).
.2 Quarles v. Searle, Cro. Jac. 96, 79 Eng. Rep. 82 (K.B. 1605).
122 There is no distinction in these cases between jurisdictional facts and
jurisdictional rules. As a result, where we treat litigation on jurisdictional
facts as res judicata, the English may even today allow re-examination of
such facts in collateral actions. See Rex v. Fulham, Hammersmith &
Kensington Rent Tribunal [1951] 2 K.B. 1.
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them. Without an allegation a verdict had nothing to support it.128
In 1605 then jurisdiction by consent or estoppel was thought
possible, but the first step that led to the contrary result was taken
in requiring the plaintiff to plead that jurisdiction existed. From
here it was a short step indeed to the notion that the plaintiff had
also to prove jurisdiction, and a failure of either pleading or proof
would defeat his claim to jurisdiction."
These premises were not readily accepted, and for a large part of
the seventeenth century, cases were divided on the question whether
estoppel jurisdiction was possible when the plaintiff failed to allege
his jurisdictional facts. Some judges thought that "after verdict it
shall be intended" that the inferior court had jurisdiction, thus per-
mitting jurisdiction by estoppel.'25 In the end, it became accepted
that the allegation of jurisdiction was necessary and without it
jurisdiction did not exist.'26 The allegation itself, in other words,
was jurisdictional.
Once such a premise was accepted, there was no convenient
stopping place-if the scent went through a hollow log, the courts
followed it there. It was soon clear that whoever relied on the
first court's judgment in a second action, had to allege the first
court's jurisdiction anew.12 In other words the burden of alleging
the court's jurisdiction never ceased; and whenever the judgment
was in question, whoever sought to support it always had the burden
of asserting its validity. Once again, such a pleading rule implied
the additional requirement that the one who pleads must prove.
Thus we reach the peculiar rule that the burden of proving juris-
diction is upon him who sustains, not upon him who attacks, the
123 Cf. SHIPMAN, COMMON LAW PLEADING 531-33 (1923) (what pleading
defects may be aided by verdict); STEPHEN, op. cit. supra note 120, at 225.
... Golding v. Jackson, 2 Rolle 498, 81 Eng. Rep. 941 (K.B. 1625). This
was a case originating in the Marshalsea court and it was an action on the
case, an action Coke had expressly said was outside the Marshall's juris-
diction. Yet the King's Bench did not mention any rule against consent to
jurisdiction, but rather puts the decision on the procedural ground.
... Truscott v. Carpenter, 1 Ld. Raym. 229, 91 Eng. Rep. 1050 (K.B.
1697); Gwinne v. Poole, 2 Lut. 935, 1560, 125 Eng. Rep. 522, 858 (C.P.
1693); cf. Lucking v. Denning, 1 Salk. 201, 91 Eng. Rep. 180 (K.B.
1702); Bernard v. Bernard, 1 Lev. 289, 83 Eng. Rep. 411 (K.B. 1670) (no
final decision; plaintiff dismissed after judges argued among themselves for
several terms).
... See, e.g., Moravia v. Sloper, Willes. 30, 125 Eng. Rep. 1039 (C.P.
1737). Cf. Dye v. Olive, March N.C. 117, 82 Eng. Rep. 437 (K.B. 1636).
.2 An officer is sued for false arrest; he justifies under the process of an
inferior court. He must allege the jurisdiction of the inferior court. See,
e.g., cases cited in note 126 supra.
19611
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judgment .' And of course if jurisdiction had to be proved again
in a collateral action, it could be disproved. The net result, of
course, was that an inferior court judgment could be attacked at any
time. Regardless of the defendant's lack of proof in the first action,
if he could ever find proof to dispute the first court's jurisdiction,
he could try his case a second time.129
At this point the no consent rule exists de facto, dictated by the
initial requirement that the plaintiff had to plead jurisdiction. Since
proof followed pleading and even proof could never conclusively
establish jurisdiction, it was clear that an admission could not
supply what pyoof could not; that is, even an admission of juris-
diction would not bind the defendant.
The initial assumption that something would give jurisdiction
by estoppel was dissipated by the procedural facts of life. Once
the burden was cast upon the plaintiff it followed him forever, and
no "admittance" could be effective. It must be said that contrary
arguments were made even as late as the nineteenth century. 30 But
they could not carry the day against the rigidities of procedure.
And by 1677 the pleading rule was characterized as a "presumption"
against the jurisdiction of inferior courts.' Procedure had de-
veloped a substantial acceptance of the no consent rule, even if it
was not articulated as such. Since the rule was developed so largely
by the intricacies of procedures, there was seldom any discussion
of the merits. The reasons for limiting inferior court jurisdiction
"' See Higginson v. Martin, 1 Fr. 322, 89 Eng. Rep. 239, also reported
2 Mod. 195, 86 Eng. Rep. 1021 (K.B. 1677); Squib v. Holt, 1 Fr. 193, 89
Eng. Rep. 137, reported sub nzom Squib v. Hole, 2 Mod. 29, 86 Eng. Rep.
922 (K.B. 1675). But cf. Temple Kilingworth, Carth. 189, 90 Eng. Rep.
715 (K.B. 1691); Mendyke v. Stint, 2 Mod. 271, 86 Eng. Rep. 1067 (K.B.
1677).
"' For example, in Squib v. Holt, supra note 128, the plaintiff had alleged
jurisdiction; defendant pleaded to the merits and thereby "had admitted the
jurisdiction of the Court"; the officer then allowed the defendant to escape
and the plaintiff sued the officer for permitting the escape. The officer put
proof to the jury in Common Pleas that the inferior court had no jurisdic-
tion. The Common Pleas jury agreed. See also Terry v. Huntington,
Hardr. 480, 145 Eng. Rep. 557 (Ex. 1668); cf. Mico v. Morris, 3 Lev. 234,
83 Eng. Rep. 666 (K.B. 1685), apparently assuming that it made no differ-
ence whether or not proof in the inferior court was offered; former action is
no bar to the second action where plaintiff can prove he brought first action
in a court of no jurisdiction.
"' See the argument of Sir Frederick Pollock in Rex v. Justices of
Cumberland, 5 L.J. 11 (Mag. Cas. 1835).
... Peacock v. Bell, 1 Saund. 69, 85 Eng. Rep. 81, 84, also reported 2
Keb. 226, 84 Eng. Rep. 142, reported sub iorn Hiccocks v. Bell, 2 Keb. 183,
84 Eng. Rep. 114 (K.B. 1677).
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provided a base for the no consent rule and its accidental develop-
ment out of procedure. Thus no one ever had to consider whether
the rule was a sound part of judicial procedure.,'
32
Development of "'Subject Matter" as The Test of Competence
This is no place to explore aberrant conceptions of "subject
matter." It is enough to say that, in general, almost any juris-
dictional defect or procedural requirement not relating to jurisdic-
tion of the person is treated as a defect of "subject matter" juris-
diction that cannot be waived. 3  More careful writers (and some
who are not so careful) treat "subject matter" as relating to a kind
or class of case.'8 4 Now although Coke had emphasized "cause"
in much the same way that we emphasize "subject matter," the Eng-
lish courts generally tended to give greater prominence to territorial
limitations on jurisdiction, limitations we should probably treat as
venue requirements. How then did we reach the black-letter doc-
trine so often used that the parties cannot consent to jurisdiction of
the subject matter?
Several lines of influence can be seen. First, the term "subject
matter" began to be used long before it acquired any special sig-
nificance. Judges of the late seventeenth century began using the
term as a matter of judicial elegance. Jurisdiction, they would say
learnedly, 3 5 is composed of jurisdiction of the place, the person and
the subject matter. However, this analysis was superfluous because
a defect in any of these phases of jurisdiction would render the
judgment void. Thus "subject matter" did not have any special
meaning. Cases of this sort put the idea in view that jurisdiction
over the "subject matter" was in some way separable from jurisdic-
tion over the person.1
6
18 Goebel, Constitutional History and Constitutional Law, 38 COLUM.
L. REv. 555, 569 (1938).
188 See note 5 supra.
... See RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 7 (1942).
.. E.g., Terry v. Huntington, Hardr. 480, 145 Eng. Rep. 557 (Ex. 1668).
... The separation of "matter," or "subject matter" or "cause" is very
old but it originally has no special meaning. See HORN, THE MIRROR OF
JUsTIcES, bk. III, ch. 1 (7 Seld. Soc., Whittacker ed. 1895), where "power
to entertain the cause" is listed along with such objections as "false Latin."
The term "matter" or "cause" became common as a loose and vague ex-
pression, not referring to any modern concept of "subject matter" but to any
kind of jurisdiction, including, for example, territorial jurisdiction. See
Prince's Case, 5 Co. Rep. 29b, 77 Eng. Rep. 96 (K.B. 1600). The phrase
was also used in connection with "pendent" jurisdiction, i.e., if ecclesiastical
courts had "jurisdiction of the Original and principal matter," they had
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A second factor that emphasized "subject matter," was the "face
of the record" rule, that prohibition would not be granted after
judgment unless the jurisdictional defect showed on the record.187
This rule tended to diminish the English emphasis on territorial
competence in some cases, because the English courts refused to
take judicial notice that Hull-Bridge was within the jurisdiction of
Hull,"2 8 or that River Lisbon was indeed a river.' 8 Thus territorial
or geographical facts did not, practically speaking, show on the face
of the record. What would show? Most clearly and most often
the record would show a lack of what we might call "subject mat-
ter" jurisdiction-for example, that a claim of tort was brought in
a court created to hear only claims of debt and the like. 4°
By the first of the eighteenth century, cases began to imply that
"subject matter" had, perhaps, a special significance-that one could
not consent to jurisdiction of the subject matter.' Such implica-
tions were followed shortly by express dicta to the same effect.' 42
However, the same judges who proposed such an approach did not
use it consistently 43 and believed that jurisdiction could be con-
ferred by "common error."' 44 "Subject matter," as a primary test
jurisdiction of the "dependent matter." Anonymous, 1 Rolle 12, 81 Eng. Rep.
291 (K.B. 1615). All these usages are merely descriptive of different kinds
of jurisdictional requirements; they do not import any special consequences
for "jurisdiction of the subject matter."
18 Dean Gavit reaches the same conclusion by a slightly different route.
See Gavit Jurisdiction of Courts (pts. 1-3), 11 IND. L.J. 324, 439, 524, 546
(1936).
... Bernard v. Bernard, 1 Lev. 289, 83 Eng. Rep. 411 (K.B. 1670).
... Tourson v. Tourson, 1 Rolle 80, 81 Eng. Rep. 342 (K.B. 1614): it
might be an arm of the sea.
.40 Roberts v. Humby, 3 Mees. & W. 120, 150 Eng. Rep. 1081 (Ex. 1837):
action of inferior court limited to debt. Held: this action was not in debt,
this fact showed on the record, therefore, prohibition will issue after judg-
ment. There was no discussion of "subject matter." Similarly, a suit in in-
ferior court for an amount greater than the court's jurisdictional limit will
show. Cf. Clarke v. Cork., Palm. 564, 81 Eng. Rep. 1222 (K.B. 1628), in-
volving, however, some question of intent.
1 Gwinne v. Poole, 2 Lut. 935, 1560, 125 Eng. Rep. 522, 858 (C.P.
1693).
142 Lucking v. Denning, 1 Salk. 201, 91 Eng. Rep. 180, also reported Holt.
186, 90 Eng. Rep. 1001 (K.B. 1702). See also Parker v. Clerke, 3 Salk. 87,
91 Eng. Rep. 708, reported sub zom Parker v. Clerk, 6 Mod. 252, 87 Eng.
Rep. 999 (K.B. 1704); Gardner v. Booth, 2 Salk. 548, 91 Eng. Rep. 464
(K.B. 1698).
.. In Shotter v. Friend, 2 Salk. 547, 91 Eng. Rep. 462 (K.B. 1690), re-
ported sub nom Shatter v. Friend, 1 Show. 158, 89 Eng. Rep. 510 (K.B.
1691), Holt, C.J., made the question of prohibition after judgment turn, not
on "subject matter" defects, but on the fact that the judgment itself "in this
case is the grievance."
... Clay v. Snelgrave, 1 Ld. Raym. 576, 91 Eng. Rep. 1285 (K.B. 1700).
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of competence, never succeeded in England. Even in the nineteenth
century, English judges occasionally implied that parties might
consent to what we should call subject matter jurisdiction.
14 5
The first American cases after statehood are likewise remarkable
for their lack of emphasis on "subject matter." The American
courts under the written constitutions accepted the rule that "the
parties cannot give jurisdiction where the law does not."'146 This
much was a part of the legal folklore, and although a few courts
failed to recognize the no consent rule in the early years of the nine-
teenth century, most of them accepted it readily. It made sense to
courts which had to look for their powers, not in an amorphous tra-
dition, but in written instruments. 147 It seemed particularly useful in
the context of a federal system.14s Yet the early American statement,
in the context of a federal system. 48 Yet the early American state-
ment that parties could nzever give jurisdiction, was far too broad.
Price v. Morgan, 2 Mees. & W. 53, 55, 150 Eng. Rep. 665, 666 (K.B.
1836), per Parke, B.: "I should hesitate, when the writ has been obtained by
the plaintiff himself, to grant a new trial on the ground of misdirection
[of the writ to] the under-sheriff," i.e., on the ground that the writ was di-
rected for trial to a court of no jurisdiction except in debt.
In the eighteenth century it is comparatively easy to find cases that treat
subject matter jurisdiction as waivable. See Penn v. Baltimore, 1 Ves. Sen.
444, 27 Eng. Rep. 1132 (Ch. 1750): after an objection to the jurisdiction
that can only be considered an objection to the subject matter jurisdiction,
the court said: "[A]nswering submits to the jurisdiction ... : yet a court of
equity, which can exercise a more liberal discretion than common law courts,
if a plain defect of jurisdiction appears at the hearing will no more make a
decree, than where a plain want of equity appears." Id. at 447, 27 Eng. Rep.
at 1134. Some, not obviously misprints, will state the rule in reverse:
"[I]f the Court has not a general jurisdiction of the subject-matter, he must
plead to the jurisdiction and cannot take advantage of it upon the general
issue." Mostyn v. Fabrigas, 1 Cowp. 161, 172, 98 Eng. Rep. 1021, 1027
(K.B. 1774); see, however, the discussion of this case in Moore v. Houston,
3 Serg. & R. 169 (Pa. 1817). Even where consent is not allowed to confer
jurisdiction the term subject matter is not likely to be used. See, e.g., The
Queen v. Judge of the County Court of Shropshire, 20 Q.B.D. 242 (1887) ;
It re Aylmer, 20 Q.B.D. 258 (1887); Lawrence v. Wilcock, 11 Ad. & El.
941, 113 Eng. Rep. 672 (K.B. 1840), all cited as expressing the "subject
matter" test in 17 Am. & ENG. ENcy. LAW 1061 (2d ed. 1900).
"" See, e.g., Bent's Ex'r v. Graves, 3 McCord 280 (S.C. 1825); Low v.
Rice, 8 Johns. 409 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1811).
"" This had been so from the beginning in the American colonies. See
HASKINS, LAW AND AUTHORITY IN EARLY MASSACHUSETTS passim, but
especially 140 (law of logic), 141, 143 (Scripture as a source of law) (1960).
Jurisdiction in England derived from tradition, prescription, fiction; its
boundaries did not seem final to Englishmen. Compare M'Call v. Peachy,
5 Va. (1 Call.) 48 (1798).
4A8 fair number of cases after the American Constitution arose in a
multi-sovereign context. See, e.g., Vanderheyden v. Young, 11 Johns. 150
(N.Y. 1814); Moore v. Houston, 3 Serg. & R. 169 (Pa. 1817).
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It had to be limited. The specific problem, never explicitly articu-
lated, but nevertheless real, was this: how shall we narrow the rule
against jurisdiction by consent; how shall we phrase a rule that
permits consent?
The term "subject matter" was handy. Coke had spoken of
"cause," Holt of "subject matter," and American decisions had
already used the term in a quite different sense, i.e., to mean a
specific res.49 The term had the advantage of having no referent;
it could mean anything. By the middle of the nineteenth century
the American courts were no longer saying that parties can never
consent to jurisdiction. The "subject matter" test was gaining
general usage.'50
The textwriters' mania for generalization and for labels en-
couraged acceptance of the term. In the latter part of the nineteenth
century Freeman's first book 51 on judgments puts forth the subject
matter test somewhat cautiously. But he provided a theory for the
rule: only the law can confer jurisdiction of the "subject matter."
He neatly bypassed the fact that the law also confers jurisdiction of
the person. 52 Thus Bracton's premise, that all jurisdiction flows
from the sovereign, after five hundred years produced the conclusion
that today permits the parties two bites at the cherry. In that half
a millenium a single expression of policy in support of such a rule
adorns our books: "The jurisdiction of the common law must not be
encroached upon. 153
CONCLUSION
Policies for the no consent rule have, of course, been present in
a curious farrago of constitution-making, jealousy and conceptual
accident. But almost every reason that history suggests to support
the rule against jurisdiction by consent has disappeared. Even the
problems of our own federal system do not measure up to the heated
conflict of the English courts. We need not look to the jurisdictional
149 See Rose v. Himely, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 241 (1808).
1.. Kentucky used the subject matter test early in Lindsey v. M'Clelland,
4 Ky. (1 Bibb.) 262 (1808). The term had a general acceptance in the
middle of the nineteenth century and after. Hobart v. Frost, 5 Duer. 672
(N.Y. 1856). The subject matter test was argued before the Virginia court,
which rejected it. M'Call v. Peachy, 5 Va. (1 Call.) 48 (1797).
... FREEMAN, JUDGmENTS 87 (1873).152 Id. at 90.




concept to gain adequate appellate review of cases otherwise barred
from revision. A written constitution gives us a basis for insuring
reasonable rules of law and procedure wholly independent of the
jurisdictional concept. Neither is it required to build the larger
framework of power, and we no longer need fear that a court which
takes an unwarranted jurisdiction may, by so doing, acquire juris-
diction by prescription or by "common error." Except, perhaps, in
the divorce cases, the curious notion that a court applied only one
system of law-its law 54-- is dispelled by a fairly developed system
of conflict of laws.
Furthermore, it is apparent today that the problem of our judicial
system is the problem of overburden rather than under-work, the
problem of finality rather than the problem of injustice. When the
no consent rule was developing, res judicata was not the significant
legal tool that it is today, and the policies of res judicata were not
weighed in the balance.
Possibly there are policies peculiar to our own judicial system
that justify the use of the no consent rule, even if it forces two trials
where one is enough. For example, the no consent rule is some-
times used to protect unrepresented third parties.'55 The same pro-
tection could be gained, if desirable, by limiting the res judicata
effect of a judgment rather than by voiding it altogether. But
present policies in favor of the no consent rule cannot be explored
here.
The history of the rule, on the other hand, suggests one policy
worth mentioning. Coke analogized 56 courts to members of the
body. Each had a function. "If the eie [eye]," he said, usurps the
work of the hand, this would "assuredly produce disorder and dark-
ness, and bring the whole body out of order. . . ." This analogy
"" See Hastie, J., dissenting in Alton v. Alton, 207 F.2d 667, 684-85 (3d
Cir. 1953).
... See Alton v. Alton, 207 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1953), where both spouses
in a divorce action appeared in a non-domicilary territory. The judge raised
the jurisdictional question and denied his jurisdiction. On appeal, held, no
jurisdiction. The public interest of the domiciliary state must be protected
by denial of jurisdiction. The real problem, as is sometimes recognized, is
not so much a question of jurisdiction as it is a question of res judicata, or
the range of force a judgment should have as against unrepresented third
parties. Cf. Sampsell v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 2d 763, 197 P.2d 739
(1948). The problem of the unrepresented third-party, whether the domi-
ciliary state or an individual, arises only where the judgment purports to
adjudicate in rem a status in which others may be interested.. Preface to 4 COKE.
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may suggest to a modem reader a test for consent to jurisdiction:
is the court involved endowed with so much expertise that it, and
only it, can reasonably try the case? If so, no consent of the parties
should impair its province. But as between two courts of equity, do
we need to be concerned if one mistakenly assumes jurisdiction, and
the parties do not make timely objection? Or should we be con-
cerned only if the "proper" court, like the "eie," is the only member
that can do the proper job? History, at least, suggests little more.
